Insurance monopoly and renegotiation

Summary The mechanism design problem of a monopoly insurer — faced with privately informed insurees — is considered. It is assumed that the insurer cannot commit not to renegotiate (by using the information that customer separation reveals) before contracts are put into force. A solution is offered by modeling renegotiation-proofness in a framework inspired by Greenberg's theory of social situations. Maximizing profit within the set of renegotiation-proof outcomes always leads to a semi-separating outcome (i.e. neither full pooling nor full separation can occur) and may leave all low-risks as well as some of the high-risks self-insured.This work originated with Asheim and Nilssen (1991). The authors thank Paul Beaudry, Mathias Dewatripont, John Hillas, Terje Lensberg, Georg Nöldeke, Trond Olsen, Michel Poitevin, Eric van Damme, and especially Joseph Greenberg, as well as participants at seminars in Bergen, Cambridge, Florence, Helsinki, London, Mons, Montreal, Oslo, Stony Brook, and Tilburg for helpful comments and discussions. Asheim thanks Tilburg (CentER), McGill and Humboldt Universities for their hospitality and acknowledges support from the Norwegian Research Centre in Organization and Management and the Norwegian Research Council. Nilssen acknowledges support from Norges Bank and the Norwegian Research Council for Science and the Humanities.     

Capital Structure under Costly Enforcement*

We consider financial structure and repayment behavior in a setting where cash flows are private information to the entrepreneur and the cost of enforcing repayment differs across security holders. If enforcement costs are lower for shareholders than for creditors, a mixed capital structure with debt and equity can obtain in equilibrium. Under a mixed capital structure, creditors intervene in low cash‐flow states while shareholders intervene in high cash‐flow states. Moreover, strategic defaults, costly bankruptcy, shareholder intervention, and violation of absolute priority occur with positive probability on the equilibrium path. Several of the predictions from our framework are consistent with evidence not readily explainable by existing theories.     

The demand for money in secular perspective: The case of Norway, 1867–1980

This paper presents some evidence from Norwegian data on some of the long-standing empirical issues of money demand. The choice of a scale variable and the issue of simultaneous equations bias is subjected to some recently developed statistical tests. The outcome favours a permanent income model of money demand. No significant simultaneity bias was detected. Various specifications of explanatory variables, like the own yield on money, interest rates and price expectations as well as the issues of price level homogeneity and stability between subperiods are also considered in the paper.     

A quantitative reassessment of the purchasing power parity hypothesis: Evidence from Norway and the United Kingdom

Annual data from Norway and the United Kingdom from 1874 to 1971 are used to reassess the empirical performance of the purchasing power parity (PPP) doctrine. The simple version of the PPP relationship is supported by the data only if different short-run dynamics during a floating-rate period 1914–1928 is allowed for. Two sets of factors were found to be important in amending the simple PPP model. These were short-run cyclical variables affecting the adjustment towards the PPP equilibrium relationship and long-run structural factors such as productivity and terms of trade. Within this expanded model the proportionality between the exchange rate and relative price levels could not be rejected.     

New series for agricultural prices in London, 1770–1914

New annual series for the prices of major agricultural commodities sold in London markets between 1770 and 1914 are presented. These series are based on bimonthly observations drawn from newspaper market reports. The products covered are wheat, barley (grinding and malting), oats, potatoes, hay, butter, beef, mutton, and pork. Annual prices are calculated for both calendar and production years. The new series are compared to existing series.     

The use of macroeconomic models in economic policy making: The Norwegian experience

Planning in Norway has a long tradition. The use of models is an integral part of short- and medium-term economic policy administration. A large-scale input-output model, MODIS IV, is used as the short- and medium-term forecasting and planning model. The use of the model secures consistency when analysing the economy. The model is very open in the sense that important interrelations in the economy are left out. The model contains only ‘good’ relations in the Leif Johansen sense of the word. Smaller aggregate and more closed versions of the model are used for analysing policy alternatives. These models contain both ‘good’ and ‘bad’ relations. The use of macroeconomic models is an important aid for proposals regarding economic policy in the Ministry of Finance. Because the whole ministry (with expert help from other ministries) takes an active part in the model work, MODIS IV serves as the centralizing mechanism. It helps to make economists from many ministries go around the same centre, speak the same ‘language’ and organize all relevant information and judgements in a consistent way. Experience shows that ‘numbers discipline’ and force the different arguments on to a higher level of precision.     

Optimal Financial Structure: An Incomplete Contracting Model

The financial structures of firms observed in practice typically consist of debt claims of different priority and maturity, and outside equity with unconditional control. A simple model is developed in which this type of complex financial structure arises endogenously as a mechanism to allocate control and cash flow rights among the firm's manager and its investors. While short-term debt commits the manager to liquidate the firm in low profit states, outside equity with unconditional control allows investors to seize control in states where the manager otherwise would pursue low profit projects with high private benefits of control. Finally, long-term (junior) debt creates a debt overhang that protects the manager from excessive shareholder involvement.
JEL classification : G 32     

Relationship Quality—Relationship Value and Power Balance in Business Relationships: Descriptives and Propositions

Purpose: The objective of this study is to develop understanding of the interplay between the perceptions of power balance, relationship value, and relationship quality between retail distributors and their suppliers.

Methodology: The authors applied a phenomenological approach in both qualitative and quantitative data collections and analyses. Key informants in 27 of the dominant retail distributors within 5 Norwegian industries and 50 of their most important suppliers were interviewed.

Findings: The power balance seems to favor the retail distributors. Retail distributors and suppliers tell of somewhat different characteristics pertaining to “best” and “worst” relationships relating to economic-, capability-, and integration-based values as perceived between retail distributors and their suppliers.

Research limitations/implications: The empirical findings indicate the complexity in assessing relationship quality and show a rich basis for further research, thereby contributing to knowledge and insights in characterizing relationship quality when power is asymmetrically distributed between distributors and their suppliers. However, personal interviews may reveal answers at rational, cognitive, and even emotional levels, thus complicating subjective analysis.

Practical implications: The results of the study are important for both researchers and practitioners on both sides of retail distributor–supplier relationships.

Originality/value: This study advances the work on what characterizes relationship quality in asymmetric power business relationships.     

Measuring Innovation in European Industry

This paper analyses the results of the 1993 Community Innovation Survey (CIS). Fifty per cent of European firms introduced a product or process innovation during 1990-92. The share of innovating firms varies between industrial sectors and firm size. The percentage of innovating firms is higher for large firms than for smaller ones. In high-tech sectors this share is two thirds and for traditional ones is one third. The largest part of firms' expenditure for innovation is linked to the adoption and diffusion of technologies through machinery and equipment, which absorbs 50% of firms' innovation expenditure. R&D activities represent, on average, 20% of total innovation expenditure while other innovative activities, such as design and trial production, account respectively for 10% and 11%. The mix of innovation inputs, especially R&D and investment, is strongly correlated with firm size, displays little change across countries and varies greatly across industries.